This is an attempt to expose the essence of Samuelson's consumptionloan paradox. It is maintained that the double infinity of traders and dated commodities allows for competitive equilibria that are not Pareto-optimal. While such models are most interesting in the dynamic setting, the fact that generations do not meet is not essential. The chain-letter aspect of the model reminds us that the appropriate form of the budget constraint is not obvious for the potentially infinitely long-lived economic entity (such as the corporation or the family). The analysis is related to recent contributions in the theories of general equilibrium, economic planning, and decentralization. A. In an economy with births and deaths, all souls cannot meet in a single market. Since Spiro Agnew cannot haggle over chocolate with George Washington and Buck Rogers, the usual assumptions of general equilibrium theory are violated.
?
where ut(*) (t -0, 1, . . . ) is the utility of individual t, cs is consumption of chocolate by individual t in period s (s -1, 2, . . . ). We can make whatever assumption we like about the durability of chocolates. To be somewhat specific, we can assume that they are perfectly nondurable. The endowment matrix of figure 1 recapitulates the story.
5. In this pure-exchange model, it is easily demonstrated that the zerointerest-rate price system is a competitive-equilibrium price system. Choosing chocolate in period 1 as the numeraire, if for each period the interest rate is zero, then 
If chocolates cannot be stored without spoiling, then in each period total chocolate consumption must be two units, t=O, 1,2 Therefore, even when all souls are able to transact business in the same Walrasian market, the absence of Pareto-optimality persists in the competitive-equilibrium model. This absence of Pareto-optimality is implicit in Gamow's hotel problem.5 An innkeeper has committed each of the denumerably infinite number of beds on a certain rainy night. A guest asks for a bed when all are occupied, but a bed can be found if the innkeeper requires each guest to move down one bed. In our little chocolate game, the imposed allocation can produce one extra chocolate. In the hotel problem, on the other hand, the innkeeper by imposing an allocation will be able to produce a denumerable infinity of extra beds.
8. Back to our problem of chocolate allocation. Assume man 0 declares that the paper wrapper from his chocolate is money. If he is able to convince the future generation to accept his wrapper as legal tender, he will be able to make a chocolate profit called seigniorage. Let Jtt be the price of money in period t in terms of chocolate in period t. Assume that there are no liquidity or transactions demands for money, so that the only reason money has a place in portfolios is as a store of value. As before, competitive equilibrium chocolate prices must be such that: pt _ 1 for t 1, 2, .. ., while the chocolate price of money must satisfy nt < 1 for t 1, 2.... The competitive equilibrium in this money-chocolate world is Pareto-optimal if and only if "one chocolate is brought backward," that is ( path. In the neoclassical one-sector model, the price of consumption must equal the price of capital, since both investment goods and consumption goods are produced. The net rate of return on holding capital is zero, so each family would be better off if it could exchange all its capital for consumption goods. Supply of capital exceeds demand and there seems to be no price system that will support the (efficient) Golden Rule consumption program.' 11. The above analysis is incomplete. In order to argue that no zerointerest-rate competitive equilibrium exists, I implicitly assumed a special form of the budget constraint for each of the n families, to wit: As t approaches infinity, each family's wealth at time t must approach some nonnegative number. More precisely, I might have asumed that: 10 A zero rate of interest implies that for equilibrium the marginal rate of transformation between consumption in any two periods is -1. But there seems to be no motivation for the family to hold capital in the zero interest state, since (taking prices as given) it could increase consumption over its Golden Rule value (= wages) by selling all assets.
11 The assumption is that the limit inferior of family wealth must be nonnegative. Family wealth could oscillate with nonexistence of a simple limit. We might insist that the limit of the lower "envelope" of family wealth (or limit inferior) then be nonnegative. vector x -(x1, . . ., xi, . . .M, X) in V, where o1(i -1,..., m) is a scalar. If, on the other hand, V is not a finite dimensional vector space, then the linear functional L may not be representable as such an inner product.'3 In a model with a denumerable infinity of different commodities but only a finite number of agents, Debreu (1954) shows that in a special sense, every Pareto-optimal allocation is a valuation equilibrium. Now this is the usual separating-hyperplane theorem we look for in "finite" economies, with one important difference. In this Debreu model, the budget constraints and "separating hyperplanes" are written as general linear functionals-not necessarily representable as inner products of price vectors and quantity vectors.
In the model with infinitely long-lived families, we have already asked what meaning can be attached to this more general budget constraint. Similarly, what is the economic interpretation to be given to a separating hyperplane that does not provide a price vector for the decentralized economy?
13. Even in infinite-horizon planning problems, the separating-hyperplane14 theorems are in terms of a linear functional which is not necessarily representable by the inner product of some infinite dimensional vector of prices and an infinite dimensional vector of quantities. See, for example, Radner (1967) . As I show in the Varenna Lectures (Shell 1969) , this is closely related to the zero-interest-rate counterexample to the alleged transversality conditions used by some authors writing on the theory of optimal growth.
14. There is a basic difficulty with the notion of Pareto-optimality when one passes from the discrete-time model of (say) Samuelson to a continuous-time analog. Whether there is an infinite horizon or not, the number of individuals in the discrete model is countable, while the number of individuals in the continuous model is not countable. When the number of individuals is not countable, then the definition of Pareto-optimality is altered: The allocation A * is said to be Pareto-superior to the allocation A if under A* no individual is worse off than under A and the set of individuals better off under A* is of measure greater than zero; A is a 13 See, e.g., Dunford and Schwartz (1957) . 14 A hyperplane is a flat of deficiency 1. A flat is a translate of a linear subspace of V. A subspace W in V has deficiency h if there exists an h-dimensional subspace X such that V -W + X and such that W n X is empty.
Pareto-optimal allocation if there is no allocation which is Pareto-superior to A.
If the set of individuals can be represented by the real unit interval, then an allocation may be Pareto-optimal even if another allocation in which (the countably infinite number of) individuals represented by rational numbers can be made better off and no one made worse off.
